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The word "law" is employed in the natural sciences and in
jur.sprudence. In its scientific sense, it conveys the idea of
regularity. The sun rises in the East and sets in the West,-
no-: sometimes, but always. The law of gravity is not
occasionally, but always, true. Naturally, law can be
defined as the order of the succession of natural phenomena.
When any given set of conditions is followed by a given result
the same antecedent will be followed by a similar consequent.
Regularity is not only an essential element in our idea of
natural law, but it is the only element in the idea. The word
does not embody any conception of a command by an intelli-
gent being to an intelligent nature. The regularity of nature's
phenomena is a fact, and this regularity is labeled "law."
In jurisprudence, as w%ell as in the natural sciences, the
word "law" carries with it the idea of uniformity. Thus, the
command of a despot to cut off the head of A. B. is not a law.
On the other hand, if, in practically every case where a man
dies intestate, the same rule for the division of his property is
followed, then we have a law of intestate succession. Again,
if, as a rule, every one who promises another to do or not to
do a particular thing, does what he promises under given con-
ditions, then we have a law recognizing the sacredness of
contracts.
It is usually supposed, however, that while the regularity of
the succession of phenomena is the sole feature of law as the
word is used in the exact sciences, in the word as used in its
juristic sense the command of a political superior to a
political inferior is necessary to complete the idea. Without
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denying that in some points of view this may be a correct
assertion, I want to show that, for the purpose of historical
investigation of the law in which the lawyer is learned, the
word means only what it does to the scientific man, the regu-
larity of the succession of phenomena. In this view, the only
difference in the definition will be the difference in the phe-
nomena with which the lawyer and the scientist deal. Law,
in its juristic sense, will be confined to the actions of men in
society. If a given condition produces a definite action on
the part of men in society, then there exists a law in the legal
acceptation of the term. Take an example: A., the father, is
dead. B., C. and D. are his sons. Here we have an ante-
cedent condition. Suppose that B., C. and D. will now each
have the power to do what they wish with one-third of the
property of the father. No other person in the community
will have that power. Here we have following the definite
condition, the definite action of the persons in the society in
regard to each other, i. e., between the brothers themselves
and the rest of the community. If we can predict that the
condition, a father leaving children, will be always followed
by the action, the equal division of the father's property
between the children, we have a law. The simplest definition
for the word, as employed, in its juristic sense, is that law is a
rule of action. In this view, it does not make any difference
what the reason is for the acquiescence of the individual mem-
bers of the community in the rule of equal division of property
among children. It may be a rule of action because it has so
been ordered by the legislature of the State, and the govern-
ment will employ force against the individual who refuses to
acquiesce; or it may be that no sanction follows the breaking
of the rule of action. If, as a matter of fact, it is not broken,
then we have a rile of action and a law.
As opposed to this view, it may be said that a mere custom,
which anyone can break, is not a law. All men may rise at
six in the morning, but if there is no obligation to do so,
which obligation has a sanction or penalty for disobedience,
then we have a rule of action perhaps, but not a law. Thus,
in this view, the sense of obligation to follow the rule, as w'ell
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as the rule itself, is essential to the idea of law. And again,
this sense of obligation, with a penalty for disobedience is, it
is sa:d, not the only additional requisite to the idea of law in
its juristic sense. The penalty itself must be inflicted by the
political authority known as government. Thus, it may be
"dishonorable" for a man not to challenge another who has
insulted him. The disapprobation of "society," more terrible
than the pains of the law, may be the sanction of the rule of
action, and yet the "laws of honor" are not laws; the
penalties are not given by an organization; those who break
them, have not disobeyed the commands of a political supericr.
The idea of a command by a political superior, capable of
enforcing obedience, or the penalty for disobedience as well as
uniformity, and the sense of obligation to follow the rule, are
thus made essential to the idea of municipal law, or law in its
juristic sense.
Thus, in the first view, law is simply a rule of action, if the
rule is followed no matter from what motive, it is a law.
There is only one difference between the term as so employed
and as employed in the natural sciences. In the latter, uni-
versality and unchangableness, while impossible of absolute
proof, are always assumed. With law in its legal sense,
however, the liability to change exists, and while uniformity
makes "human laws" rules of action, the uniformity in society
is never universal. How universal a rule of action must be
before it can be said to be a rule of action at all is a question
of taste. We can draw the line anywhere we want to, except
that absolute universality can never be insisted upon, or we
would have no laws at all.
In the second view, two other requisites are necessary: the
obligation to perform the law, and the enforcement of the
obligation by a political organization which has commanded it
to be obeyed.
Now both of these definitions as to the way in which the
term law, in its legal sense, should be employed are, fiom
their several points of view, correct. The difference indicates
only a difference in the range of phenomena to be examined.
One covers all rules of action, customs, as well as commands-
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the other only those which are commands from organized
government. If we desire to analyze and to study law as it is
enforced to-day in the government under which we live, then,
of course, all the elements contained in the second point of
view are essential. But if we wish to adopt the historical
method of studying the development of rules of action which
are now enforced by our government, then we must abandon
all thought of confining our observations to rules of action
which have been commands, or even to those to which an
obligation of any kind is attached.
From the historical standpoint, law is a rule of action and
nothing more. Government is itself a growth as well as ideas of
private property and mutual rights of persons in society. But
the origin of rights lies back of the origin of governments.
In fact, one of. the causes for the growth of government was
the felt necessity of enforcing a definite line of conduct irre-
spective of individual desire. But back of and prior to the
enforcement of law on delinquent individuals, back even of the
felt obligation on the part of the individual to follow definite
lines of conduct, was the fact that definite lines of conduct
were, as a rule, followed.
An illustration will tend to make my meaning clear. The
possession of property in common by all the living members
of the family, which is the origin of our law of the devolution
of property on death, existed in "village communities." Yet
this rule of law had no recognized government to enforce it.
Thus the village community in India recognized, to a certain
extent, this common enjoyment of property, and -yet one
cannot discern any organization or government which would
have inflicted a penalty for the disregard of the rule. Again,
the sense of obligation to follow it resting on the individual
members of the community, if it existed at all, was probably
exceedingly indistinct, because there was no idea of the possi-
bility of not following it, and the obligation to obey a rule
only comes with the recognized possibility of breaking it, and
probably a realized personal advantage in so doing. The
customs of primitive communities are more universal rules of
action than any statute of modern governments, not because
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the primitive rule of action is "obeyed;" but because the
possibility of deviating from the rule does not occur to the
primitive mind. When the possibility of deviating from the
custom occurred, then the sense of obligation not to deviate
had an opportunity to develop. With some rules of action,
the idea of obligation became strong enough to enforce
obedience on others who failed to feel the obligation. Thus
all laws in the sense of commands by organized society
through its government to individuals, have passed, if they are
not of a purely administrative, corrective, or reformatory
character, through three distinct stages. First, we find them
simply customs; then customs which the individual felt, as a
rule, a moral obligation to follow; and lastly, customs which
the community, as a whole, felt justified in forcing the individual
to conform to, regardless of his own desires or feelings of
obligation, Thus, for instance, the morning gift of the Saxons,
by which we mean the rule that a wife, on her husband's death,
was entitled to one-half of her husband's property, was at first
merely a custom for the husband to give the wife something
to provide for her in case she outlived him, the reason for this
provision was that among the Teutonic peoples the wife did not
share as one of the children in the father's property, as at the
Roman law. Afterwards, the custom of giving the wife one-
half the husband's property as morning gift was so universal,
and the felt obligation to make this provision so strong, that
the courts enforced as law what the community had come to
recognize as a moral duty. In the same way we can go over
the development of contracts at the common law. It was not
until the end of the last century that contracts in England
were enforced as they are to-day. Yet the custom for men,
as a rule, to perform their agreements, is not confined to the
modern Englishmen. From the custom grew the obligation,
from the obligation grew the enforcement of it as law.
Custom, therefore, is the life of law. Viewing the subject
from the standpoint of the historian, law is the custom of the
community. Of course, as society develops, the customs
which will be enforced by the community are separated from
those which the individual is left to follow or not as he will.
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Something more than immemorial custom must be back of a
rule of action before the community will enforce obedience to
it. Dimly or vividly perceived, the welfare of the community
in the continuance of the custom, some good higher than that
of the single individual, stands back of all enforced customs,
making valid the feeling of obligation for its performance,
which is the justification for its enforcement.
The student of legal history, therefore, cannot permit him-
self to be confined to the laws which are "commands of
government." The further he goes back in the history of any
enforced law, the nearer he gets to the "custom" which was
its origin, and which gives it to-day the vitality which really
keeps it in force. The purpose of his study must be to trace
the slow development of customs and ideas, and their effect in
the development and change of positive and "enforced law."
In speaking of the -custom' which lies back of positive
rules of action, it should be born in mind that it is only those
customs which touch the everyday life of the individual that
are of any great importance in relation to the development of
jurisprudence. It is from these chief customs that the individual
abstracts those ideas which lie at the base of his conception of
social relations. These fundamental ideas are properly termed
the " legal institutions" of the country. A legal institution
simply denotes an all prevailing idea of social relations, which
idea, growing out of the deep rooted customs of the community,
is the foundation for numerous "rules of action." The modern
idea of the marriage relation and its sacredness-the idea of
freedom and sacredness of contracts-the idea of absolute
ownership in severalty of property acquired-are all modern
legal institutions or ideas of social relations fundamental to
civilization as it exists and from which spring many minor
rules of action. Into all the minor details of the law's develop-
ment it is impossible for any one man to hope to go, but any
one who has the inclination can study the development of the
fundamental ideas of the family, the state, communal, and
individual ownership, and mark their chief results in the domain
of law. In view of the importance of such a study from the
standpoint of one who professes to care anything about the
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development of our civilization, it is a subject of wonder that
so little general knowledge exists. This ignorance is perhaps
due as much as anything else to the indifference of lawyers
themselves to anything connected with the law which is not
practical, i. e., productive of immediate revenue.
Since, from the standpoint of historical jurisprudence, law
is simply a "rule of action," the student of legal history is
engaged primarily in tracing what have been and what are
these rules of action, rather than in speculating on the power
which enforced law. The "enforcement" is, as we have seen,
not a necessary part of his conception of law, because he does
not look on law as a command. But to the analytical jurist,
i. e., one who analyzes the law which the court to-day enforces,
the "command" is the central idea in the conception of law.
Thus, Austin, the chief of the analytical jurists, says that a
law in its juristic sense is a rule laid down for the guidance of
an intelligent being by a sovereign person or sovereign .body
of persons. In defining what he means by a "sovereign body
of persons," he says that it is to be known by the following
characteristics: First, "The bulk of a given society are in a
habit of obedience or submission to a determinate and common
superior, let that common superior be a certain individual
person or a certain body or aggregate of individual persons.
Second, that certain individual, or certain body of individuals,
is not in a habit of obedience to a determinate human superior."
Again, he says: "If a determinate human superior, not in the
habit of obedience to a like superior, receive habitual obedience
from the bulk of a given society, that determinate superior is
sovereign in that society, and that society (including the
superior) is a society political and independent." To every
sovereignty is attached an independent political society. From
this there are deduced several propositiens. There cannot be
two bodies sovereign in the same political society. There
cannot be such a thing as limited sovereignty. There cannot
be a government at once supreme and dependent. Austin
has gone into elaborate reasonings to show where the sover-
eignty is in different governments. His investigation starts
with the assumption that if he only looks long enough he will
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be able to lay his hand directly on the sovereign in any
political society.
What Austin meant by sovereignty and sovereign, the
writer fails to understand. The handling of the subject is
foreign to the historical method of investigation with which
he is familiar. The discussion of Austin, however, does sug-
gest a real problem of no little difficulty, though whether it is
the same problem which Austin was trying to solve, is not alto-
gether clear. At any rate, it is one which lies at the threshold
of the study of law's development and has to do with sov-
ereignty in the only two senses in which the word is intelligible
to the student of legal history.
In examining the facts of social and political life, we all
recognize, first, that many laws are obeyed by particular indi-
viduals against their desire; and, second, that law develops
and changes. Taking up this line of thought, we may ask
ourselves two questions: What is it that enforces the law?
What is it that changes the law? These are two distinct
questions.
In primitive societies, law is not enforced in the modem
sense. That is, a man can break the law if he wishes. The
rule of conduct is followed because men never wish to break
it. Therefore, in primitive societies the first question would
have no meaning. But as society advances, the domain of
law widens. That is, as it comes to deal with more compli-
cated relations, and men's actions are less influenced by heredity
and more by an intelligent appreciation of the pleasure result-
ing to themselves, there arises the necessity to enforce the
law which would otherwise, in many instances, be disregarded.
The machinery which enforces the law is known as government.
The sovereignty in the community in its first sense is the force
which stands back of the government in its enforcement of the
law. Now, in a sense, no matter who has the government,
whether a single person, or body of persons, whether we call
it monarchical, aristocratic or democratic, the real factor which
is back of the enforcement of law, is the brute force of the
community. The people desire the law as it is, or they, do
not care to alter it, or know not how to alter it, which is the
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same thing. The Czar of Russia is said to be sovereign
through his dominions. He is said to command all the laws
which he permits to exist. Yet his real strength lies in the
fact that the brute force of the community is behind him
aiding in the law's execution. Take a regiment under the
leadership of a single man. In one sense, the commanding
officer is the ruling power; in another sense, the regiment or
rather any of the members who, by force of numbers, arms, skill,
etc., could by brute force overcome the rest, is the power which
would force the individual will if force were necessary. Carlisle
has said that discipline in arms is always a miracle. I would add
that law and government are also miracles. Why should the
people, why should the army of Russia obey the Czar? Why
should the people of the United States recognize as laws to be
obeyed the acts of Congress or of State Legislatures? These
are questions which I do not believe one of the sixty-five
millions of us could'answer satisfactorily to himself. If, there-
fore, we regard the question of sovereignty from a statical
standpoint, as what enforces the law, we must answer that as
far as there is any force, it is the brute force of the community.
We come now to the second question, "What causes changes
in the law?" I suppose that most of us would ascribe such
changes to legislation. Legislation is indeed the immediate
source of many changes. But we must remember that
only that is law which men in society actually, as a matter of
fact, follow. Men follow a rule of action because they desire to
follow it. The brute force in the sense just explained is behind
those laws alone which the people, as a whole, desire to follow.
They cease following one rule of action and follow another be-
cause they desire to change and follow that other. Be the
causes of change what they may, the fact that man does change
his ideas concerning rules of conduct is undisputed. Now,
if A. changes his opinion, from whatever cause, of what it
ought to be, C. may, from that very fact, change his opinion
also. All of us, some in a greater and some in a less degree,
influence others. Our changing opinions as to what ought to
be the law, as far as they affect others, tend to change the law.
If, therefore, we call sovereignty the power of changing the
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law, in so far as each of us can effect our fellows we are each
sovereign. Sometimes the changing opinions of one man
changes or affects the opinions of many others. The Czar of
Russia issues an ukase. It is his personal opinion as to what
ought to be. Instantly, millions of Russians recognize that
which he has said as the rule of action which, from various
motives, partly religious, partly political, but mainly as an
inherited tendency, they desire to and do follow. What a
Czar does in high degree, a judge does to less extent. For
instance, a court of high authority applies the principles of law
to a new case. In doing so, the court may alter those prin-
ciples hitherto received. This may be done consciously or
unconsciously. True, the fiction is always kept up that the
old principles are not altered. The farthest a court will ever
admit that it has gone at the time of the decision, will be to
say that it is returning to sound principles, anciently in force
before some recent mistakes. And yet, if a new principle
really has been established, the truth will in subsequent cases
be acknowledged and even pointed out with pride. The Czar
and the judge each have a large measure of sovereignty in
this sense of the term. But this sovereignty, or the capacity
to change the opinions of others and consequently to develop
the law, is not confined to those in office. The individual
advocates a change in the laws, others follow his opinion, and
as a result of his agitation, the change takes place. Thus each
of us are in a degree sovereign, but each in a different degree.
In this second sense, as the actual power to change the law
sovereignty is never absolute. We have never heard of a
person, no matter what influence he might have on the
desires of others, who was sovereign in this absolute sense.
Take the most absolute monarch that ever sat upon a throne,
(and none more absolute than the eastern potentate, whose
"'word is law" and whose subjects would sacrifice their lives
to grant him the slightest wish) even he is not sovereign,
perhaps, indeed, far less sovereign, in the sense we are now
discussing, than many a private citizen of influence in a
western community. For if an eastern potentate ever thought
of legislating, which he never does, except to enact a new tax
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law; if he ever, for instance, attempted to change the law of
the devolution of property on death, perhaps taking from 'the
heir, the ability (prized by all religious Hindoos), to perform
the sacra, he would find that his law, for the first time, would
not be obeyed, and his power would be undermined. In a
certain class of laws, those dealing with the army and the
revenue, the sovereignty is unquestioned, but on other subjects
there is practically no sovereignty at all.
Take again the Congress of the United States. Are its
-members sovereign? In a sense, yes; in another, no. Let
them all be convinced, or a majority of them, that interstate
freight should be regulated along certain lines, then regular
action will'on this subject make a new law. It is absurd to
say that in this instance they hold but a delegated sovereignty.
The people who elected them may have never thought of
interstate commerce or its regulation. On certain subjects
these men are sovereign, but only on certain subjects. Let
them pass a statute giving the property of the country to men
over six feet. This could never be a law in the sense in which
we use that term as a recognized legal relation. It is true it
would be unconstitutional, but though the written constitution
were to be formally abolished to-morrow, and the Congress in
formal terms said to be unlimited in power, the limitation to
its sovereignty by the facts, would still remain unaltered. It
could no more make an act, such as we have mentioned,
recognized as law, than could the British Parliament, which
is theoretically omnipotent. A limited sovereignty is often
said to be a contradiction in terms. It would seem, however,
from our analysis, that if we mean by sovereignty, the actual,
not theoretic power, to change the laws, sovereignty is always
limited. And not only is sovereignty in this sense always
limited, but if we add together the sovereignty of a great
number of persons, the sum will never be any absolute
sovereignty in the sense that any change which they may
advocate will be followed by the brute force of a community
and given the force of law. The changing opinions of influ-
ential men would not alone suffice to change the laws in every
particular. Man's influence over his fellow men is never so
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absolute. Law has its basis ultimately in the conditions
physical, economic and social which exist. The influence
of a change in opinion without a change in conditions must be
limited.
Before leaving the subject it may be well to point out that
the term sovereignty is sometimes used in a purely legal
sense, as the theoretical power to make absolute changes in
the law. Thus, in this sense, Parliament is absolute. Any
rule of action made by it would be technically law- from the
lawyer's standpoint; though, as we have seen, not actually
law, because the direction of Parliament would, as a matter
of fact, only be followed within certain limits. In this sense,
conventions in three-fourths of the United States are with us
sovereign, because their united action could produce a change
in our constitution. As used in this last sense, the term
"sovereignty" is of no importance to the student of law's
development. His business is to deal with actualities-not
with theoretic possibilities.
